## Signing with higher dimensional isogenies

#### **Pierrick Dartois**

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#### The Deuring correspondence

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## The Deuring correspondence

The Deuring correspondence

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## The Deuring correspondence

Supersingular elliptic curves	Quaternions	
$j(E)$ or $j(E)^p$ supersingular	$\mathcal{O} \cong End(E)$ maximal order in $\mathcal{B}_{p,\infty}$	
$\varphi: E \longrightarrow E'$	left $\mathcal{O}$ -ideal and right $\mathcal{O}'$ -ideal $I_arphi$	
$\varphi, \psi: E \longrightarrow E'$	$I_{arphi} \sim I_{\psi} \; (I_{\psi} = I_{arphi} lpha)$	
$\widehat{arphi}$	$\overline{I_{\varphi}}$	
$\varphi \circ \psi$	$I_\psi \cdot I_arphi$	
$ heta\inEnd(E)$	Principal ideal $\mathcal{O}\theta$	
$deg(\varphi)$	$nrd(I_arphi)$	

#### The Deuring correspondence

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## Hard and easy problems

#### Hard problems

- Supersingular Isogeny Problem: Given two supersingular elliptic curves  $E_1, E_2/\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ , find an isogeny  $\varphi: E_1 \longrightarrow E_2$ .
- Supersingular End Ring Problem: Given a supersingular elliptic curve  $E/\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ , compute End(E).
- These two problems are equivalent [Wes22].

#### Easy problems

- **Connecting ideal:** Given two maximal orders  $\mathcal{O}_1, \mathcal{O}_2 \subset \mathcal{B}_{p,\infty}$ , find a left  $\mathcal{O}_1$ -ideal *I* that is also a right  $\mathcal{O}_2$ -ideal.
- Vélu: Given G = ker(φ) (with #G smooth), compute φ [Vél71].
- Quaternion path problem: Given a left *O*-ideal *I*, find *J* ~ *I* of smooth norm [KLPT14].
- Ideal translation: Given a left *O*-ideal *I* of smooth norm, compute the associated isogeny φ<sub>I</sub> [DKLPW20].

The Deuring correspondence Hard and easy problems

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Computing isogenies via the Deuring correspondence

- Let  $E_1$  and  $E_2$  of known endomorphism rings  $\mathcal{O}_1 \cong \text{End}(E_1)$  and  $\mathcal{O}_2 \cong \text{End}(E_2)$ .
- Compute a connecting ideal I between  $\mathcal{O}_1$  and  $\mathcal{O}_2$ .
- Compute  $J \sim I$  of smooth norm via KLPT.
- Translate J into an isogeny  $\varphi_J : E_1 \longrightarrow E_2$ .


Becomes hard when  $End(E_1)$  or  $End(E_2)$  is unknown.


SQIsign Effective Deuring correspondence

## SQIsign and effective Deuring correspondence

SQIsign Effective Deuring correspondence


The SQIsign identification scheme [DKLPW20; FLLW23]





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## Fiat-Shamir transform [FS87]



public
Signer's secret
published by Signer

**Signature:** message *m*, public key  $E_A$ , secret key  $\tau$ .


- Commitment  $\psi : E_0 \longrightarrow E_1$ .
- Challenge φ := H(E<sub>1</sub>, m) (where H is a hash function).
- Compute and send signature (E<sub>1</sub>, σ) to the verifier.

## **Verification:** $E_A$ , m, $(E_1, \sigma)$ .

- Recompute  $\varphi := H(E_1, m)$ .
- Verify that  $\widehat{\varphi} \circ \sigma$  is cyclic.

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## How to compute the signature $\sigma$ ?



- Compute  $J := \overline{I_{\tau}} \cdot I_{\psi} \cdot I_{\varphi}$ .
- Find *I* ~ *J* random of norm nrd(*I*) = ℓ<sup>e</sup> (KLPT).
- Compute  $\sigma$  associated to *I*.

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Ideal-to-isogeny I [GPS20]

**Input:**  $E/\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  supersingular,  $\mathcal{O} \cong \text{End}(E)$  and I a left  $\mathcal{O}$ -ideal of smooth norm.

**Output:**  $\varphi_I : E \longrightarrow E_I$ .

Compute

$$E[I] := \{ P \in E \mid \forall \alpha \in I, \quad \alpha(P) = 0 \}.$$

• Compute  $\varphi_I$  of kernel E[I] in  $O(\text{poly}(\max_{\ell \mid \text{nrd}(I)} \ell))$  operations over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^k}$ , where  $E[I] \subseteq E(\mathbb{F}_{p^k})$ .

**Issue:** If *I* is a KLPT output, then  $nrd(I) \simeq p^{15/4} \gg p$  so *k* is exponentially big. Not practical for SQIsign !


SQIsign Effective Deuring correspondence

## Ideal-to-isogeny II [FLLW23]

Main idea: Cut the computation into smaller pieces. Write

 $I = I_0 \cdot I_1 \cdots I_{n-1}$  and  $\varphi_I = \varphi_{n-1} \circ \cdots \circ \varphi_1 \circ \varphi_0$ 

with  $\operatorname{nrd}(I_0) = \cdots = \operatorname{nrd}(I_{n-1}) = \ell^f$ .



The endomorphisms  $\theta_i$  are meant to refresh the  $\ell^f$ -torsion.

**Torsion requirements:**  $\ell^f T | p^2 - 1$  so that  $E[\ell^f T] \subseteq E(\mathbb{F}_{p^4})$ , where  $\deg(\theta_i) = T^2$  and  $T \simeq p^{5/4}$ .

Issue: This is slow!

Another approach to effective Deuring correspondence Embedding isogenies in higher dimension Computing isogenies in dimension 4

## Higher dimensional isogenies

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## Another method to compute $\sigma$ [DLRW23]

Issue in SQIsign: deg( $\sigma$ ) has to be smooth deg( $\sigma$ ) =  $\ell^e \simeq p^{15/4}$ .

**Our idea:** Take deg( $\sigma$ ) non smooth. Then deg( $\sigma$ )  $\simeq \sqrt{p}$ .

- Evaluate  $\sigma$  on  $E_A[\ell^e] \subseteq E_A(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})$ .
- $\bullet$  Use the following algorithm to evaluate  $\sigma$  everywhere.

#### Theorem (Robert, 2022)

Let  $\sigma : E \longrightarrow E'$  of degree  $q < \ell^e$ . There exists a polynomial time algorithm with:


- Input:  $(\sigma(P_1), \sigma(P_2))$ , where  $(P_1, P_2)$  is a basis of  $E[\ell^e]$  and  $Q \in E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})$ .
- Output:  $\sigma(Q)$ .

**Context:** This idea comes from the attacks against SIDH [CD23; MM22; Rob23].

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## Evaluating $\sigma$

**Main idea:** Use the alternate path  $\varphi \circ \psi \circ \hat{\tau}$ .



$$[D_{\psi}D_{\varphi}D_{\tau}]\sigma = \varphi \circ \psi \circ \gamma \circ \widehat{\tau}$$

 $(D_{\eta}, D_{\Omega}, D_{\tau}) \wedge \ell = 1$ :

$$\sigma(P) = [\lambda] \varphi \circ \psi \circ \gamma \circ \widehat{\tau}(P),$$

with  $\lambda D_{\psi} D_{\omega} D_{\tau} \equiv 1 \mod \ell^e$ .

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*d*-isogenies and the dual isogeny in higher dimension

#### Definition (*d*-isogeny)

Let  $\varphi : (A, \lambda_A) \longrightarrow (B, \lambda_B)$  be an isogeny between two principally polarized abelian varieties (PPAV). We define:

• 
$$\widetilde{\varphi} := \lambda_A^{-1} \circ \widehat{\varphi} \circ \lambda_B : B \longrightarrow A.$$

$$B \xrightarrow{\lambda_B} \widehat{B} \xrightarrow{\widehat{\varphi}} \widehat{A} \xrightarrow{\lambda_A^{-1}} A$$

• We say that  $\varphi$  is a <u>*d*-isogeny</u> if  $\widetilde{\varphi} \circ \varphi = [d]_A$ .

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## Kani's embedding lemma [Kan97]

#### Definition (isogeny diamond)

An (a, b)-isogeny diamond is a commutative diagram s.t.:



where  $\varphi, \varphi'$  are *a*-isogenies and  $\psi, \psi'$  are *b*-isogenies.

#### Lemma (Kani)

Consider the (a, b)-isogeny diamond on the left. Then:

• 
$$F: A \times B' \longrightarrow B \times A'$$
,

$$F := \begin{pmatrix} arphi & \widetilde{\psi'} \\ -\psi & \widetilde{arphi'} \end{pmatrix}$$

is a d-isogeny with d = a + b.

• If  $a \wedge b = 1$ , then

$$\ker(F) = \{ (\widetilde{\varphi}(x), \psi'(x)) \mid x \in B[d] \}.$$

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## Application of Kani's lemma to SQIsignHD

#### Embedding $\sigma$ in higher dimension:

- Let  $q = \deg(\sigma)$ .
- Let  $a_1, a_2 \in \mathbb{Z}$  s.t.  $a_1^2 + a_2^2 + q = \ell^e$ .
- q should be good:  $\ell^e q$  prime  $\equiv 1 \mod 4$ .
- Consider the isogeny diamond:

$$\begin{array}{c} E_2^2 \xrightarrow{\alpha_2} E_2^2 \\ \Sigma & \uparrow & \uparrow \\ E_A^2 \xrightarrow{\alpha_A} E_A^2 \end{array}$$

where  $\Sigma := \text{Diag}(\sigma, \sigma)$  and for i = A, 2,

$$\alpha_i := \begin{pmatrix} a_1 & a_2 \\ -a_2 & a_1 \end{pmatrix} \in \mathsf{End}(E_i^2).$$

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Application of Kani's lemma to SQIsignHD

#### Embedding $\sigma$ in higher dimension:

• Then

$$F := \begin{pmatrix} \alpha_1 & \widetilde{\Sigma} \\ -\Sigma & \widetilde{\alpha}_A \end{pmatrix} \in \mathsf{End}(E_A^2 \times E_2^2).$$

is an  $\ell^e\text{-}\text{isogeny.}$ 

And

 $\ker(F) = \{ ([a_1]R - [a_2]S, [a_2]R + [a_1]S, \sigma(R), \sigma(S)) \mid R, S \in E_A[\ell^e] \}.$ 

• *F* can be computed in polynomial time [LR12; LR15; LR23; DLRW23].

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Algorithm for higher dimensional isogeny computations

• The  $\ell^e$ -isogeny F can be computed as a chain of  $\ell$ -isogenies:

$$\mathcal{A}_{0} \xrightarrow{F_{0}} \mathcal{A}_{1} \xrightarrow{F_{2}} \mathcal{A}_{2} \quad \cdots \quad \mathcal{A}_{e-1} \xrightarrow{F_{e}} \mathcal{A}_{e}$$


- Each *l*-isogeny can be computed in O(*l<sup>g</sup>*) efficiently in the Θ-model [LR12; LR15; LR23; DLRW23].
- The whole chain can be computed in time  $O(\ell^g e \log(e))$  [JD11; DLRW23].
- This method is valid in any dimension g.

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# SQIsignHD: signing with higher dimensional isogenies

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## SQIsignHD identification scheme [DLRW23]



- public
- Prover's secret

— published by Verifier

— published by Prover

Secret key:  $\tau$ 

Commitment: E<sub>1</sub>

Challenge:  $\varphi$ 

**Response:**  $(q, \sigma(P_1), \sigma(P_2))$ 


- Compute  $I \sim \overline{I_{\tau}} \cdot I_{\psi} \cdot I_{\varphi}$  random of norm  $q \simeq \sqrt{p}$ .
- Compute a canonical basis (P<sub>1</sub>, P<sub>2</sub>) of E<sub>A</sub>[ℓ<sup>e</sup>].
- Evaluate  $\sigma = \varphi_I$  on  $(P_1, P_2)$ .

• Send 
$$(q, \sigma(P_1), \sigma(P_2))$$
.

Very fast !

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## SQIsignHD identification scheme [DLRW23]




- —— public
  - Prover's secret
    - published by Verifier
    - published by Prover

**Response:**  $(q, \sigma(P_1), \sigma(P_2))$ 

**Verification:** Compute the embedding  $F \in \operatorname{End}(E_A^2 \times E_2^2)$  of  $\sigma$ .


- Find  $a_1, a_2 \in \mathbb{Z}$  such that  $a_1^2 + a_2^2 + q = \ell^e$  (Cornacchia).
- Compute the canonical basis (P<sub>1</sub>, P<sub>2</sub>) of E<sub>A</sub>[l<sup>e</sup>].
- Compute ker(F), knowing a<sub>1</sub>, a<sub>2</sub>, P<sub>1</sub>, P<sub>2</sub>, σ(P<sub>1</sub>), σ(P<sub>2</sub>).
- Compute F.
- Accept if  $F \in \operatorname{End}(E^2_A imes E^2_2)$  and
  - $F(Q,0,0,0) = ([a_1]Q, -[a_2]Q, *, 0).$



SQIsignHD

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# Fiat-Shamir transform [FS87] of SQIsignHD



- —— public
  - Signer's secret
    - published by Signer

**Signature:** message *m*, public key  $E_A$ , secret key  $\tau$ .

- Commitment  $\psi : E_0 \longrightarrow E_1$ .
- Challenge φ := H(E<sub>1</sub>, m) (where H is a hash function).
- Compute and send signature  $(E_1, q, \sigma(P_1), \sigma(P_2))$  to the verifier.

**Verification:**  $E_A$ , m,  $(E_1, q, \sigma(P_1), \sigma(P_2))$ .

- Recompute  $\varphi := H(E_1, m)$ .
- Use  $\varphi$ , q,  $\sigma(P_1)$ ,  $\sigma(P_2)$  to compute the embedding F of  $\sigma$ .
- Check that  $F \in \text{End}(E_A^2 \times E_2^2)$  and  $F(Q, 0, 0, 0) = ([a_1]Q, -[a_2]Q, *, 0).$

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#### Parameter choice

• Characteristic: as in SIDH,

$$p = c\ell^f \ell'^{f'} - 1.$$

with *c* small.

- In practice  $\ell = 2$  and  $\ell' = 3$ . For NIST-1,  $p = 13 \cdot 2^{126} \cdot 3^{78} 1$ .
- Use of  $\ell^{f}$ -torsion: the 4-dimensional isogeny *F*.
- Use of  $\ell'^{f'}$ -torsion:  $\tau$ ,  $\psi$ ,  $\varphi$ .
- $E_0: y^2 = x^3 + x$  defined over  $\mathbb{F}_p$   $(p \equiv 3 \mod 4)$ . End $(E_0)$  is known.

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## Outline of the security analysis

#### Theorem (Fiat-Shamir, 1986)

Let ID be an identification protocol that is:

- Complete: a honest execution is always accepted by the verifier.
- **Sound:** an attacker cannot "guess" a response.
- **Zero-knowledge:** the response does not leak any information on the secret key.

Then the Fiat-Shamir transform of ID is a universally unforgeable signature under chosen message attacks in the random oracle model.

## Soundness

#### Similar to SQIsign

#### Proposition (Special soundness)

Given two transcripts  $(E_1, \varphi, q, \sigma(P_1), \sigma(P_2)), (E_1, \varphi', q', \sigma'(P_1'), \sigma'(P_2'))$ with the same commitment  $E_1$  and  $\varphi \neq \varphi'$ , we can extract  $\alpha \in \text{End}(E_A)$ non-scalar.

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#### Proof.

- Exctract  $\sigma$  from  $(q, \sigma(P_1), \sigma(P_2))$  and  $\sigma'$  from  $(q', \sigma'(P'_1), \sigma'(P'_2))$ .
- Then  $\alpha := \widehat{\sigma'} \circ \varphi' \circ \widehat{\varphi} \circ \sigma \in \text{End}(E_A)$  is non-scalar.

## Zero-knowledge

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#### Definition (Recall)

We say that an integer q is **good** if  $\ell^e - q$  is a prime  $\equiv 1 \mod 4$ .

#### Definition (RUGDIO)

A random uniform good degree isogeny oracle (RUGDIO): **Input:** A supersingular elliptic curve  $E/\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ . **Output:** An isogeny  $\sigma : E \longrightarrow E'$  of good degree q s.t.

- E' is uniform among supersingular elliptic curves.
- Given E',  $\sigma$  is uniform among isogenies of good degree  $E \longrightarrow E'$ .

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## Zero-knowledge

#### Theorem

Assume that:

- *E*<sub>1</sub> is computationally close to uniform.
- We have access to a RUGDIO.

Then SQIsignHD is computationally honest-verifier zero-knowledge.

#### Proof.

We build a simulator  $\mathcal S$  of protocol transcripts:

- S calls the RUGDIO to generate  $(q, \sigma(P_1), \sigma(P_2))$ .
- S generates a random challenge  $\widehat{\varphi}: E_2 \longrightarrow E_1$ .
- S outputs  $(E_1, \varphi, q, \sigma(P_1), \sigma(P_2))$ .

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## Zero-knowledge: comparison with SQIsign

#### Heuristic assumptions to prove the zero-knowledge property

#### In SQIsign:

•  $\sigma: E_1 \longrightarrow E_2$  is computationally indistinguishable from a random isogeny of degree  $\ell^e$ .

#### In SQIsignHD:

- *E*<sub>1</sub> is computationally close to uniform.
- We have access to a RUGDIO.

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## Fast and compact signatures

• Signature time: 28 ms on a 13th Gen Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-1335U (4600MHz) CPU.

#### Signature size comparison

	In SQIsign	In SQIsignHD
Asymptotic (in bits)	$\sim 23/4\log_2(p)$	$\sim 13/4\log_2(p)$
NIST-1 security level (in bytes)	204	109

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## A promising POC for the verification

**Timing:** 855 ms in sagemath with  $p = 13 \cdot 2^{126} \cdot 3^{78} - 1$  on a 13th Gen Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-1335U (4600MHz) CPU.

- Challenge computation (φ): 60 ms.
- Dimension 4  $2^{142}$ -isogeny: 770 ms with  $\Theta$ -coordinates of level 2.
  - $F \in \operatorname{End}(E_A^2 \times E_2^2)$  is divided in two:

$$E_A^2 \times E_2^2 \xrightarrow{F_1} \mathcal{C} \xleftarrow{\widetilde{F}_2} E_A^2 \times E_2^2$$

- Compute  $F_1$  and  $\widetilde{F}_2$ .
- Check that codomains of  $F_1$  and  $\tilde{F}_2$  match.
- Compute  $F_2 := \widetilde{F}_2$
- Isogeny evaluation: 25 ms.

$$F(Q, 0, 0, 0) = F_2 \circ F_1(Q, 0, 0, 0)$$

## Conclusion

## Comparison of SQIsignHD with SQIsign

	SQIsign	SQIsignHD
Security	× Ad-hoc heuristic:	✓ Simpler heuristics:
	• Distribution of $\sigma$ .	<ul> <li>RUGDIO;</li> </ul>
		• Distribution of <i>E</i> <sub>1</sub> .
Signing time	✗ 400 ms for NIST-1	√ 28 ms for NIST-1
Signature size	$\checkmark$ 204 bytes for NIST-1	$\checkmark$ 109 bytes for NIST-1
Verification	✓ Fast (6 ms for NIST-1)	× 850 ms for NIST-1
		in sagemath

## Thank you for listening.

Find our pre-print here: https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/436