

SQISignHD: signing with higher dimensional isogenies

Pierrick Dartois

Joint work with Antonin Leroux, Damien Robert and Benjamin Wesolowski
Acknowledgements to Luca De Feo

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- 1 SQISign
- 2 Representing an isogeny in higher dimension
- 3 Algorithms for response and verification
- 4 Commitment (and key generation)
- 5 Security analysis
- 6 Performance
- 7 Conclusion

SQISign

Representing an isogeny in higher dimension

Algorithms for response and verification

Commitment (and key generation)


Security analysis

Performance


Conclusion

SQISign


The SQISign identification scheme (DFKLPW, 2020)



- public
- Prover's secret
- published by Verifier
- published by Prover



Fiat-shamir transform




- public
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Signature: message m , public key E_A , secret key τ .

- Commitment $\psi : E_0 \rightarrow E_1$.
- Challenge $\varphi := H(E_1, m)$
(where H is a hash function).
- Compute and send signature (E_1, σ) to the verifier.

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Verification: $E_A, m, (E_1, \sigma)$.

- Recompute $\varphi := H(E_1, m)$.
- Verify that $\hat{\varphi} \circ \sigma$ is cyclic.


NB: Not necessary to send E_1 .

How to compute the signature σ ?

The Deuring correspondence


Supersingular elliptic curves	Quaternions
$j(E)$ or $j(E)^p$ supersingular	$\mathcal{O} \cong \text{End}(E)$ maximal order in $\mathcal{B}_{p,\infty}$
$\varphi : E \rightarrow E'$	left \mathcal{O} -ideal and right \mathcal{O}' -ideal I_φ
$\varphi, \psi : E \rightarrow E'$	$I_\varphi \sim I_\psi$ ($\exists \alpha \in \mathcal{B}_{p,\infty}, I_\psi = I_\varphi \alpha$)
$\widehat{\varphi}$	$\overline{I_\varphi}$
$\varphi \circ \psi$	$I_\psi \cdot I_\varphi$
$\theta \in \text{End}(E)$	Principal ideal $\mathcal{O}\theta$
$\deg(\varphi)$	$\text{nrd}(I_\varphi)$

How to compute the signature σ ?



- Compute $J := \overline{\text{I}_\tau} \cdot \text{I}_\psi \cdot \text{I}_\varphi$.
- Find $I \sim J$ of norm $\text{nrd}(I) = \ell^e$ (KLPT, 2014 & FKL PW, 2020).
- Compute σ associated to I .

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Ideal-to-isogeny translation:

- $\text{nrd}(I) = \deg(\sigma) = p^{15/4}$ (DFLW, 2022).
- Not enough ℓ^\bullet -torsion accessible.
- σ is computed piecewise (DFLW, 2022). **It is slow.**

Representing an isogeny in higher dimension

Efficient isogeny representation

Definition

An **efficient representation** of an isogeny $\varphi : E \rightarrow E'$ is a couple (D, \mathcal{A}) , where:

- 1 D is polynomial size data (in $\log(p)$, $\log(\deg(\varphi))$).
- 2 \mathcal{A} is an algorithm computing $\varphi(P)$ on input D and $P \in E(\mathbb{F}_{p^k})$ in polynomial time (in $\log(p)$, $\log(\deg(\varphi))$ and k).

Efficient isogeny representation

Example (efficient representation): If $\varphi : E \rightarrow E'$ is an ℓ^e -isogeny:

- D : chain of ℓ -isogenies $E = E_0 \xrightarrow{\varphi_0} E_1 \cdots E_{e-1} \xrightarrow{\varphi_{e-1}} E_e = E'$.
- \mathcal{A} : evaluate each isogeny of the chain successively.

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State of the art :

- All efficient representations are essentially equivalent to this one.
- Only smooth degree isogenies can be represented (explains the use of KLPT in SQISign).
- In SQISign, the conversion of an ideal I into such a representation (isogeny-chain) is costly.

d -isogenies

- Let $\varphi : (A, \lambda_A) \rightarrow (B, \lambda_B)$ be an isogeny between PPAV¹.
- Consider $\tilde{\varphi} : (B, \lambda_B) \rightarrow (A, \lambda_A)$ the isogeny

$$B \xrightarrow{\lambda_B} \hat{B} \xrightarrow{\tilde{\varphi}} \hat{A} \xrightarrow{\lambda_A^{-1}} A$$

¹Principally polarized abelian varieties.

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Lemma


If $d = \ell^e$, then φ can be decomposed as a product of ℓ -isogenies

$$A = A_0 \xrightarrow{\varphi_0} A_1 \xrightarrow{\varphi_1} \dots \xrightarrow{\varphi_{e-2}} A_{e-1} \xrightarrow{\varphi_{e-1}} A_e = B$$

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Kani's lemma (K, 1997)

An (a, b) -**isogeny diamond** is a commutative diagram:




with:

- $\deg(\varphi) = \deg(\varphi') = a$.
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
(i) Assume a and b coprime with p .
Then

$$F := \begin{pmatrix} \varphi & \tilde{\psi}' \\ -\psi & \tilde{\varphi}' \end{pmatrix} : A \times B' \longrightarrow B \times A'$$

is a d -isogeny (with $d := a + b$).

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(ii) If $a \wedge b = 1$, we have

$$\ker(F) = \{(\tilde{\varphi}(x), \psi'(x)) \mid x \in B[d]\}.$$

Representation in dimension 4

We can now represent isogenies of non-smooth degrees!

Let:

- $\sigma : E_A \rightarrow E_2$ of degree $q < \ell^e$.
- $\Sigma := \text{Diag}(\sigma, \sigma) : E_A^2 \rightarrow E_2^2$.
- $a_1, a_2 \in \mathbb{Z}$, s.t.

$$a_1^2 + a_2^2 + q = \ell^e.$$

- $\alpha \in \text{End}(E_A^2)$ given by:

$$\alpha := \begin{pmatrix} a_1 & a_2 \\ -a_2 & a_1 \end{pmatrix}$$

- and $\alpha' \in \text{End}(E_2^2)$ defined as α .

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The $(q, a_1^2 + a_2^2)$ -isogeny diamond

$$\begin{array}{ccc} E_2^2 & \xrightarrow{\alpha'} & E_2^2 \\ \Sigma \uparrow & & \uparrow \Sigma \\ E_A^2 & \xrightarrow{\alpha} & E_A^2 \end{array}$$

yields an ℓ^e -isogeny

$$F := \begin{pmatrix} \alpha & \tilde{\Sigma} \\ -\Sigma & \tilde{\alpha}' \end{pmatrix} \in \text{End}(E_A^2 \times E_2^2).$$

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- We have

$$\ker(F) = \{(\tilde{\alpha}(P), \Sigma(P)) \mid P \in E_A^2[\ell^e]\}.$$

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- We have

$$\ker(F) = \{(\tilde{\alpha}(P), \Sigma(P)) \mid P \in E_A^2[\ell^e]\}.$$

- It suffices to compute $\sigma(E_A[\ell^e])$ to compute $\ker(F)$.
- F can then be computed as a chain of ℓ -isogenies.
- Knowing F , we can evaluate σ everywhere.

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- Smaller degree $q = \text{nrd}(I) \simeq \sqrt{p}$.
- Recall that $q = \ell^e \simeq p^{15/4}$ in SQISign.

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How much freedom on the choice of q ?

- Constraint: we can find $a_1, a_2 \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $a_1^2 + a_2^2 + q = \ell^e$.
- In practice: $\ell^e - q$ is a prime $\equiv 1 \pmod{4}$.

Representation in dimension 8

Representing σ of any degree $q < \ell^e$

- Find $a_1, a_2, a_3, a_4 \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that

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- Let $\Sigma := \text{Diag}(\sigma, \dots, \sigma) : E_A^4 \longrightarrow E_2^4$,

$$\alpha := \begin{pmatrix} a_1 & -a_2 & -a_3 & -a_4 \\ a_2 & a_1 & a_4 & -a_3 \\ a_3 & -a_4 & a_1 & a_2 \\ a_4 & a_3 & -a_2 & a_1 \end{pmatrix} \in \text{End}(E_A^4)$$

and $\alpha' \in \text{End}(E_2^4)$ defined as α .


- Instead, we can represent σ with the ℓ^e -isogeny

$$F := \begin{pmatrix} \alpha & \tilde{\Sigma} \\ -\Sigma & \tilde{\alpha}' \end{pmatrix} \in \text{End}(E_A^4 \times E_2^4).$$

Algorithms for response and verification

The response algorithm


Overview of the response algorithm



- Compute $J := \overline{I_\tau} \cdot I_\psi \cdot I_\varphi$.
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
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- Find $I \sim J$ random of norm $q < \ell^e$ s.t. $\ell^e - q$ is prime $\equiv 1 \pmod{4}$.
- Generate (P_1, P_2) a canonical basis of $E_A[\ell^e]$.
- Compute $(\sigma(P_1), \sigma(P_2))$ using $\varphi \circ \psi \circ \hat{\tau}$.
- Send $(q, \sigma(P_1), \sigma(P_2))$.

The response algorithm


Evaluating σ



- Let $\gamma := \hat{\psi} \circ \hat{\varphi} \circ \sigma \circ \tau \in \text{End}(E_0)$.
- We have $\mathcal{O}_0\gamma = I_\tau \cdot I \cdot \overline{I_\varphi} \cdot \overline{I_\psi}$ so we can compute γ .

The response algorithm

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


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- Then:

$$[D_\psi D_\varphi D_\tau] \sigma = \varphi \circ \psi \circ \gamma \circ \hat{\tau}$$

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
- We can evaluate σ on $P \in E_A[\ell^e]$ provided $(D_\psi D_\varphi D_\tau) \wedge \ell = 1$:

$$\sigma(P) = [\lambda] \varphi \circ \psi \circ \gamma \circ \hat{\tau}(P),$$

with $\lambda D_\psi D_\varphi D_\tau \equiv 1 \pmod{\ell^e}$.

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- In SQISignHD, D_ψ , D_φ and D_τ are powers of a prime $\ell' \neq \ell$.

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- We know a basis \mathcal{B}_0 of $\mathcal{O}_0 \cong \text{End}(E_0)$.
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Step 2: Evaluate \mathcal{B}_1 on $\ker(\varphi)$ and solve DLPs to find a basis of I_φ .

- Let $\mathcal{B}_1 := (\beta_1, \dots, \beta_4)$ and $\ker(\varphi) := \langle P \rangle$ (assuming φ cyclic).
- Compute $\beta_i(P)$ for $1 \leq i \leq 4$.
- Find i, j such that $(\beta_i(P), \beta_j(P))$ generate $E_1[D_\varphi]$.
- Let $k \neq i, j$. Find $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}/D_\varphi\mathbb{Z}$ s.t. $\beta_k(P) = a\beta_i(P) + b\beta_j(P)$.
- Let $\gamma := \beta_k - a\beta_i - b\beta_j$ and return $I_\varphi := \mathcal{O}_1\gamma + \mathcal{O}_1D_\varphi$.

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
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Degree choices:

- $D_\psi = D_\tau = l'^{2f'} \simeq p$.
- $D_{\psi'} = l^{2f} \simeq p$.
- $D_\varphi = l'^{f'} \simeq \sqrt{p}$.

The verification algorithm

Notations:

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 \uparrow \Sigma & & \uparrow \Sigma \\
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Entry: $(q, \sigma(P_1), \sigma(P_2))$.

$$\alpha := \begin{pmatrix} a_1 & a_2 \\ -a_2 & a_1 \end{pmatrix}$$

and idem for α' . $\Sigma := \text{Diag}(\sigma, \sigma)$

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Entry: $(q, \sigma(P_1), \sigma(P_2))$.

- Cornacchia: find $a_1, a_2 \in \mathbb{Z}$ s.t.

$$a_1^2 + a_2^2 + q = \ell^e.$$

The verification algorithm

Notations:

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 E_2^2 & \xrightarrow{\alpha'} & E_2^2 \\
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$$\ker(F) := \langle (\tilde{\alpha}(P_i, P_j), \Sigma(P_i, P_j)) \rangle_{i,j}$$

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- Compute F as an ℓ -isogeny chain

$$\mathcal{A}_0 \xrightarrow{F_1} \mathcal{A}_1 \cdots \mathcal{A}_{e-1} \xrightarrow{F_e} \mathcal{A}_e$$

with $\mathcal{A}_0 := E_2^2 \times E_A^2$.

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- Accept if $\mathcal{A}_e = \mathcal{A}_0$.

Verifying with less torsion

- We can divide F into

$$\mathcal{A} \xrightarrow{F_1} \mathcal{B} \xrightarrow{F_2} \mathcal{A}$$

where $\mathcal{A} := E_2^2 \times E_A^2$, F_i is an ℓ^{e_i} -isogeny (for $i = 1, 2$) and $e := e_1 + e_2$.

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- Knowing $(P_1, P_2, \sigma(P_1), \sigma(P_2))$ is sufficient to compute F_1 and \widetilde{F}_2 .
- The verifier accepts if the codomains of F_1 and \widetilde{F}_2 match.

Verifying with less torsion

Advantages:

- Use ℓ^{f_1} -torsion with $f_1 \simeq e/2$ instead of ℓ^e -torsion ($f_1 \leq f$).
- $q < \ell^e$ is not constained by the accessible torsion (more freedom on the choice of l).
- Makes signature communications $\sigma(P_1), \sigma(P_2)$ twice more compact.

Higher dimensional isogeny computation

Goal: Compute an ℓ^e -isogeny $F : \mathcal{A} \rightarrow \mathcal{B}$.

- Let \mathcal{B}_0 be a basis of $\ker(F)$.
- Decompose:

$$\mathcal{A} = \mathcal{A}_0 \xrightarrow{F_1} \mathcal{A}_1 \cdots \mathcal{A}_{e-1} \xrightarrow{F_e} \mathcal{A}_e = \mathcal{B}$$

- Let $\mathcal{B}_i := F_i \circ \cdots \circ F_1(\mathcal{B}_0)$.
- Then $\ker(F_i) = \langle [\ell^{e-i}] \mathcal{B}_{i-1} \rangle$.

Higher dimensional isogeny computation


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- Descend the computation tree to compute the F_i (DFJP, 11).

Computation tree for $e = 5$



Higher dimensional isogeny computation


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- Then $\ker(F_i) = \langle [\ell^{e-i}] \mathcal{B}_{i-1} \rangle$.
- Descend the computation tree to compute the F_i (DFJP, 11).
- Each F_i is computed with the Θ model (level $\ell = 2$).

Computation tree for $e = 5$



Commitment (and key generation)

Double path to the commitment

Goal: Compute $\psi, \psi' : E_0 \rightarrow E_1$ and $I_\psi, I_{\psi'}$ with $\deg(\psi) = \ell^{2f}$ and $\deg(\psi') = \ell'^{2f'}$.

Double path to the commitment


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Accessible torsion: $E_0[\ell^f \ell'^{f'}]$ ($p = c\ell^f \ell'^{f'} - 1$).

Double path to the commitment

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


- Compute $\gamma \in \mathcal{O}_0 \cong \text{End}(E_0)$ s.t. $\text{nrd}(\gamma) = \ell^{2f} \ell'^{2f'}$.

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


- Compute $\gamma \in \mathcal{O}_0 \cong \text{End}(E_0)$ s.t. $\text{nrd}(\gamma) = \ell^{2f} \ell'^{2f'}$.
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


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- Compute $[\theta'_1]_* \theta_2$ of kernel $\theta'_1(\ker \theta_2)$.
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


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- $\psi := [\theta'_1]_* \theta_2 \circ \theta'_2$ and $\psi' := [\theta_2]_* \theta'_1 \circ \theta_1$.
- $I_\psi := \mathcal{O}_0 \bar{\gamma} + \mathcal{O}_0 \ell'^{2f'}$, $I_{\psi'} := \mathcal{O}_0 \gamma + \mathcal{O}_0 \ell^{2f}$.

Security analysis

Outline of the security analysis

Theorem (Fiat-Shamir, 1986)

Let ID be an identification protocol that is:

- **Complete:** a honest execution is always accepted by the verifier.
- **Sound:** an attacker cannot "guess" a response.
- **Zero-knowledge:** the response does not leak any information on the secret key.

Then the Fiat-Shamir transform of ID is a universally unforgeable signature under chosen message attacks in the random oracle model.

Soundness

Similar to SQISign

Proposition (Special soundness)

Assume $q \wedge \ell' = 1$.

Then given two transcripts $(E_1, \varphi, R), (E_1, \varphi', R')$ with the same commitment E_1 and $\varphi \neq \varphi'$, we can extract $\alpha \in \text{End}(E_A)$ non-scalar.

Proof.

- Extract σ from R and σ' from R' .
- Then $\alpha := \widehat{\varphi}' \circ \widehat{\sigma}' \circ \sigma \circ \varphi \in \text{End}(E_A)$ is non-scalar.



Zero-knowledge

Definition

We say that an integer q is **good** if:

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Definition (RUGDIO)

A random uniform good degree isogeny oracle (RUGDIO):

Input: A supersingular elliptic curve E/\mathbb{F}_{p^2} .

Output: An isogeny $\sigma : E \rightarrow E'$ of good degree q s.t.

- E' is uniform in the supersingular isogeny graph.
- Given E' , σ is uniform among isogenies of good degree $E \rightarrow E'$.

Zero-knowledge

Theorem

Assume that:

- E_1 is computationally close to uniform.
- We have access to a RUGDIO.

Then SQISignHD is computationally honest-verifier zero-knowledge.

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Proof.

We build a simulator \mathcal{S} of protocol transcripts:

- \mathcal{S} calls the RUGDIO to generate an efficient representation R of $\sigma : E_A \rightarrow E_2$.
- \mathcal{S} generates a random challenge $\hat{\varphi} : E_2 \rightarrow E_1$.
- \mathcal{S} outputs (E_1, φ, R) .



Zero-knowledge: comparison with SQISign

Heuristic assumptions to prove the zero-knowledge property

In SQISign:

- $\sigma : E_A \rightarrow E_2$ is computationally indistinguishable from a random isogeny of degree ℓ^e .

In SQISignHD:

- E_1 is computationally close to uniform.
- We have access to a RUGDIO.

Zero-knowledge: the interest of dimension 8

In SQISign:

- $\sigma : E_A \longrightarrow E_2$ is computationally close to a random isogeny of degree ℓ^e .

Zero-knowledge: the interest of dimension 8

In SQISign:

- $\sigma : E_A \rightarrow E_2$ is computationally close to a random isogeny of degree ℓ^e .

In RigorousSQISignHD:

- We have access to a RADIO.

Definition (RADIO)

A random any degree isogeny oracle (RADIO):

Input: A supersingular elliptic curve E/\mathbb{F}_{p^2} .

Output: An efficient representation of a uniformly random isogeny $\sigma : E \rightarrow E'$ of degree $q < \ell^e$.

Performance

Compact signatures

In **SQISign**: $\sigma : E_A \rightarrow E_2$ of degree $\ell^e \simeq p^{15/4}$.

In **SQISignHD**: $(j(E_1), q, \sigma(P_1), \sigma(P_2))$, where:

- (P_1, P_2) is a basis of $E_A[\ell^{f_1}]$.
NB: no need to transmit (P_1, P_2) .
- $\ell^{f_1} \simeq p^{1/4}$.
- $q \simeq \sqrt{p}$.
- $j(E_1) \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ has size $2 \log_2(p)$ bits.

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Signature size (in bits)

	In SQISign	In SQISignHD
In general	$\sim 15/4 \log_2(p)$	$\sim 13/4 \log_2(p)$
NIST-1 security level	1060	840

Fast signatures at the expense of verification

Fast signature:

- Only 1-dimensional isogenies: ψ, ψ', φ .
- Evaluating $(\sigma(P_1), \sigma(P_2))$ with $\varphi \circ \psi \circ \hat{\tau}$ is fast.
- Preliminary implementation way faster than SQISign.

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- Piecewise computation involving 30 T -isogenies with $T \simeq p^{5/4}$.

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Verification:

- Isogenies in dimension 4 to compute.
- Known algorithms.
- But to be implemented...

Conclusion

Comparison of SQISignHD with SQISign

	SQISign	SQISignHD
Security	<u>Ad-hoc</u> heuristic: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Distribution of σ. 	Simpler heuristics: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RUGDIO; • Distribution of E_1.

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Verification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recompute σ as a chain of ℓ-isogenies of known kernels • $\deg(\sigma) = \ell^e \simeq p^{15/4}$ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Compute F an ℓ^e-isogeny of dimension 4 • $\deg(\sigma) = \ell^e \simeq \sqrt{p}$

Thank you for listening.

Find our pre-print here: <https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/436>