

Signing with higher dimensional isogenies

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Joint work with Antonin Leroux, Damien Robert and Benjamin Wesolowski
Acknowledgements to Luca De Feo


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Quaternions and isogenies

Elliptic curves



Elliptic curves:


- An elliptic curve E/\mathbb{F}_q is defined by:

$$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b, \quad a, b \in \mathbb{F}_q$$

with an infinite element 0_E .

- E is equipped with a commutative group law.

Isogenies - Definition



Isogenies:

Maps between elliptic curves

$\varphi : E_1 \rightarrow E_2$ such that:

- φ is a homomorphism of algebraic varieties.
- φ is a group homomorphism:

$$\varphi(P + Q) = \varphi(P) + \varphi(Q).$$

Isogenies - Examples

- The scalar multiplication $[n] : E \rightarrow E$ is an isogeny.

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- An explicit example: Consider

$$E_1 : y^2 = x^3 + x + 4 \quad \text{and} \quad E_2 : y^2 = x^3 - x + 4$$

over \mathbb{F}_7 . Then

$$\begin{aligned} \varphi : E_1 &\longrightarrow E_2 \\ (x, y) &\longmapsto \left(\frac{x^2 - 2x - 1}{x - 2}, y \frac{x^2 + 3x - 2}{(x - 2)^2} \right) \end{aligned}$$

is an isogeny.

Isogenies - the degree

Definition (The degree)

- Measures the "size" of an isogeny. More precisely

$$\deg(\varphi) = \max(\deg(f), \deg(g))$$

where $\varphi(x, y) = (f(x)/g(x), \dots)$.

- Is multiplicative: $\deg(\varphi \circ \psi) = \deg(\varphi) \deg(\psi)$.

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Definition (Dual isogeny)

If $\varphi : E_1 \rightarrow E_2$ the dual $\hat{\varphi} : E_2 \rightarrow E_1$ satisfies $\hat{\varphi} \circ \varphi = [\deg(\varphi)]_{E_1}$ and $\deg(\varphi) = \deg(\hat{\varphi})$.

Isogenies - Examples

- The scalar multiplication $[n] : E \rightarrow E$ is an isogeny of **degree** n^2 .
- The Frobenius:

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_p : E &\longrightarrow E^{(p)} \\ (x, y) &\longmapsto (x^p, y^p) \end{aligned}$$

with E/\mathbb{F}_{p^n} is an **inseparable isogeny of degree** p .

- An explicit example: Consider

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is a **separable isogeny of degree** 2.

The Endomorphism ring

Definition (Endomorphism ring)

$$\text{End}(E) = \{0\} \cup \{\text{Isogenies } \varphi : E \rightarrow E\}$$

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Theorem (Deuring)

Let E/\mathbb{F}_q ($p = \text{char}(\mathbb{F}_q)$). Then $\text{End}(E)$ is either isomorphic to:

- An order in a quadratic imaginary field. We say that E is ordinary.
- A maximal order in a quaternion algebra ramifying at p and ∞ . We say that E is supersingular.

If E is supersingular, we may assume $\mathbb{F}_q = \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$.

Quaternions - Definitions

- **Quaternion algebra ramifying at p and ∞ :** A 4-dimensional non commutative division algebra over \mathbb{Q} :

$$\mathcal{B}_{p,\infty} = \mathbb{Q} \oplus \mathbb{Q}i \oplus \mathbb{Q}j \oplus \mathbb{Q}k,$$

with

$$i^2 = -1 \text{ (if } p \equiv 3 \pmod{4}), \quad j^2 = -p \quad \text{and} \quad k = ij = -ji.$$

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- **Order:** A full rank lattice $\mathcal{O} \subset \mathcal{B}_{p,\infty}$ with a ring structure.
- **Maximal Order:** An order $\mathcal{O} \subset \mathcal{B}_{p,\infty}$ such that for any other order $\mathcal{O}' \supseteq \mathcal{O}$, we have $\mathcal{O}' = \mathcal{O}$.

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- **Maximal Order:** An order $\mathcal{O} \subset \mathcal{B}_{p,\infty}$ such that for any other order $\mathcal{O}' \supseteq \mathcal{O}$, we have $\mathcal{O}' = \mathcal{O}$.
- **Left Ideal:** A left \mathcal{O} -ideal I is a full rank lattice $I \subset \mathcal{B}_{p,\infty}$ such that $\mathcal{O} \cdot I = I$.
- **Right Ideal:** A right \mathcal{O} -ideal I is a full rank lattice $I \subset \mathcal{B}_{p,\infty}$ such that $I \cdot \mathcal{O} = I$.

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- **Equivalent left \mathcal{O} -ideals:** $I \sim J \iff \exists \alpha \in \mathcal{B}_{p,\infty}^*, J = I\alpha$.

The Deuring correspondence

Supersingular elliptic curves	Quaternions
$j(E)$ or $j(E)^p$ supersingular	$\mathcal{O} \cong \text{End}(E)$ maximal order in $\mathcal{B}_{p,\infty}$
$\varphi : E \rightarrow E'$	left \mathcal{O} -ideal and right \mathcal{O}' -ideal I_φ
$\varphi, \psi : E \rightarrow E'$	$I_\varphi \sim I_\psi$ ($I_\psi = I_\varphi \alpha$)
$\widehat{\varphi}$	$\overline{I_\varphi}$
$\varphi \circ \psi$	$I_\psi \cdot I_\varphi$
$\theta \in \text{End}(E)$	Principal ideal $\mathcal{O}\theta$
$\deg(\varphi)$	$\text{nrd}(I_\varphi)$

Computing isogenies (Easy)

Proposition

A separable isogeny is determined by its kernel. If $\varphi : E_1 \rightarrow E_2$ and $\varphi' : E_1 \rightarrow E'_2$ are separable and $\ker(\varphi) = \ker(\varphi')$, then there exists an isomorphism $\lambda : E_2 \xrightarrow{\sim} E'_2$ such that $\varphi' = \lambda \circ \varphi$.

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- Given $G = \ker(\varphi)$, we can compute φ in time $O(\sqrt{\#G})$ [BDLS20].
- Given $P \in E$ such that $G = \langle P \rangle$ and if $\deg(\varphi) = \ell^n$ with ℓ small, we compute $\varphi : E \rightarrow E'$ as a sequence of ℓ -isogenies

$$E = E_0 \rightarrow E_1 \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow E_{n-1} \rightarrow E_n$$

in time $O(n \log(n))$ [JD11].

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- Only smooth degree isogenies can be computed efficiently.

The Supersingular Isogeny Problem (Hard)

Problem (Supersingular Isogeny Problem)

Given two supersingular elliptic curves $E_1, E_2/\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$, find an isogeny $\varphi : E_1 \rightarrow E_2$.

When p has cryptographic size, this problem is hard for quantum computers.

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An easy instance: Consider $E_0 : y^2 = x^3 + x$ over \mathbb{F}_p ($p \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$) and

$$\pi_p : (x, y) \in E_0 \mapsto (x^p, y^p) \in E_0$$

$$\iota : (x, y) \in E_0 \mapsto (x, \sqrt{-1}y) \in E_0$$

Then $\pi_p^2 = [-p]$, $\iota^2 = [-1]$ and $\pi_p \circ \iota = -\iota \circ \pi_p$ and

$$\text{End}(E_0) = \left\langle 1, \iota, \frac{\iota + \pi_p}{2}, \frac{1 + \iota\pi_p}{2} \right\rangle \cong \left\langle 1, i, \frac{i+j}{2}, \frac{1+k}{2} \right\rangle$$

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Theorem (Wesolowski, 2022)

The Supersingular Isogeny Problem and the Supersingular Endomorphism Ring Problem are equivalent.

Quaternion path problem (Easy)

Problem (Connecting ideal)

Given two maximal orders $\mathcal{O}_1, \mathcal{O}_2 \subset \mathcal{B}_{p,\infty}$, find a left \mathcal{O}_1 -ideal I that is also a right \mathcal{O}_2 -ideal.

This is simple arithmetic $I \sim \mathcal{O}_1 \cdot \mathcal{O}_2$.

Problem (Quaternion path problem)

Given a left \mathcal{O} -ideal I , find $J \sim I$ of smooth norm.

Solved in polynomial time by the KLPT algorithm [KLPT14; DKLPW20].

Quaternion path problem (Easy)

Computing isogenies via the Deuring correspondence:

- Let E_1 and E_2 of known endomorphism rings $\mathcal{O}_1 \cong \text{End}(E_1)$ and $\mathcal{O}_2 \cong \text{End}(E_2)$.
- Compute a connecting ideal I between \mathcal{O}_1 and \mathcal{O}_2 .
- Compute $J \sim I$ of smooth norm via KLPT.
- Translate J into an isogeny $\varphi_J : E_1 \rightarrow E_2$.

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
Becomes hard when $\text{End}(E_1)$ or $\text{End}(E_2)$ is unknown.

SQISign and effective Deuring correspondence


The SQISign identification scheme [DKLPW20; DLW22]

$$E_0 \xrightarrow{\tau} E_A$$

- public
- Prover's secret
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


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
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


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
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


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
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


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
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Fiat-Shamir transform [FS87]




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Signature: message m , public key E_A , secret key τ .

- Commitment $\psi : E_0 \rightarrow E_1$.
- Challenge $\varphi := H(E_1, m)$
(where H is a hash function).
- Compute and send signature (E_1, σ) to the verifier.

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
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Verification: $E_A, m, (E_1, \sigma)$.

- Recompute $\varphi := H(E_1, m)$.
- Verify that $\hat{\varphi} \circ \sigma$ is cyclic.

How to compute the signature σ ?



- Compute $J := \overline{I_\tau} \cdot I_\psi \cdot I_\varphi$.
- Find $I \sim J$ random of norm $\text{nrd}(I) = \ell^e$ (KLPT).
- Compute σ associated to I .

Ideal-to-isogeny I [GPS16]

Input: E/\mathbb{F}_{p^2} supersingular, $\mathcal{O} \cong \text{End}(E)$ and I a left \mathcal{O} -ideal of smooth norm.

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Issue: If I is a KLPT output, then $\text{nrd}(I) \simeq p^{15/4} \gg p$ so k is exponentially big. Not practical for SQISign !

Ideal-to-isogeny II [DLW22]

Main idea: Cut the computation into smaller pieces. Write

$$I = I_0 \cdot I_1 \cdots I_{n-1} \quad \text{and} \quad \varphi_I = \varphi_{n-1} \circ \cdots \circ \varphi_1 \circ \varphi_0$$


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


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
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
Torsion requirements: $\ell^f T \mid p^2 - 1$ so that $E[\ell^f T] \subseteq E(\mathbb{F}_{p^4})$, where $\deg(\theta_i) = T^2$ and $T \simeq p^{5/4}$.

Ideal-to-isogeny II [DLW22]

Main idea: Cut the computation into smaller pieces. Write

$$I = I_0 \cdot I_1 \cdots I_{n-1} \quad \text{and} \quad \varphi_I = \varphi_{n-1} \circ \cdots \circ \varphi_1 \circ \varphi_0$$

with $\text{nr}(I_0) = \cdots = \text{nr}(I_{n-1}) = \ell^f$.



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Issue: This is slow!

Higher dimensional isogenies

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- Use the following algorithm to evaluate σ everywhere.

Theorem (Robert, 2022)

Let $\sigma : E \rightarrow E'$ of degree $q < \ell^e$. There exists a polynomial time algorithm with:

- **Input:** $(\sigma(P_1), \sigma(P_2))$, where (P_1, P_2) is a basis of $E[\ell^e]$ and $Q \in E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})$.
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
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Context: This idea comes from the attacks against SIDH [CD22; MM22; Rob22].


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
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


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- Then:

$$[D_\psi D_\varphi D_\tau]\sigma = \varphi \circ \psi \circ \gamma \circ \hat{\tau}$$

- We can evaluate σ on $P \in E_A[\ell^e]$ provided $(D_\psi D_\varphi D_\tau) \wedge \ell = 1$:

$$\sigma(P) = [\lambda]\varphi \circ \psi \circ \gamma \circ \hat{\tau}(P),$$

with $\lambda D_\psi D_\varphi D_\tau \equiv 1 \pmod{\ell^e}$.

Kani's embedding lemma [Kan97]

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
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- F can be computed in polynomial time [LR12; LR15; LR23; DLRW23].


SQISignHD: signing with higher dimensional isogenies

SQISignHD identification scheme [DLRW23]

Secret key: τ Commitment: E_1 Challenge: φ

- public
- Prover's secret
- published by Verifier
- published by Prover

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
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
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
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
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
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- Send $(q, \sigma(P_1), \sigma(P_2))$.

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
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Very fast !


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


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
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
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
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
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
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- Compute F .
- Accept if F is an endomorphism.

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
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Theoretical algorithm but no implementation.

Fiat-Shamir transform [FS87] of SQISignHD




- public
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Signature: message m , public key E_A , secret key τ .

- Commitment $\psi : E_0 \rightarrow E_1$.
- Challenge $\varphi := H(E_1, m)$ (where H is a hash function).
- Compute and send signature $(E_1, q, \sigma(P_1), \sigma(P_2))$ to the verifier.

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Verification:

$E_A, m, (E_1, q, \sigma(P_1), \sigma(P_2))$.

- Recompute $\varphi := H(E_1, m)$.
- Use $\varphi, q, \sigma(P_1), \sigma(P_2)$ to compute the embedding F of σ .
- Accept if $F \in \text{End}(E_A^2 \times E_2^2)$.

Outline of the security analysis

Theorem (Fiat-Shamir, 1986)

Let ID be an identification protocol that is:

- **Complete:** a honest execution is always accepted by the verifier.
- **Sound:** an attacker cannot "guess" a response.
- **Zero-knowledge:** the response does not leak any information on the secret key.

Then the Fiat-Shamir transform of ID is a universally unforgeable signature under chosen message attacks in the random oracle model.

Soundness

Similar to SQISign

Proposition (Special soundness)

Given two transcripts $(E_1, \varphi, q, \sigma(P_1), \sigma(P_2)), (E_1, \varphi', q', \sigma'(P'_1), \sigma'(P'_2))$ with the same commitment E_1 and $\varphi \neq \varphi'$, we can extract $\alpha \in \text{End}(E_A)$ non-scalar.

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Proof.

- Extract σ from $(q, \sigma(P_1), \sigma(P_2))$ and σ' from $(q', \sigma'(P'_1), \sigma'(P'_2))$.
- Then $\alpha := \widehat{\varphi}' \circ \widehat{\sigma}' \circ \sigma \circ \varphi \in \text{End}(E_A)$ is non-scalar.



Zero-knowledge

Definition (Recall)

We say that an integer q is **good** if $\ell^e - q$ is a prime $\equiv 1 \pmod{4}$.

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Definition (RUGDIO)

A random uniform good degree isogeny oracle (RUGDIO):

Input: A supersingular elliptic curve E/\mathbb{F}_{p^2} .

Output: An isogeny $\sigma : E \rightarrow E'$ of good degree q s.t.

- E' is uniform among supersingular elliptic curves.
- Given E' , σ is uniform among isogenies of good degree $E \rightarrow E'$.

Zero-knowledge

Theorem

Assume that:

- E_1 is computationally close to uniform.
- We have access to a RUGDIO.

Then SQISignHD is computationally honest-verifier zero-knowledge.

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Proof.

We build a simulator \mathcal{S} of protocol transcripts:

- \mathcal{S} calls the RUGDIO to generate $(q, \sigma(P_1), \sigma(P_2))$.
- \mathcal{S} generates a random challenge $\hat{\varphi} : E_2 \rightarrow E_1$.
- \mathcal{S} outputs $(E_1, \varphi, q, \sigma(P_1), \sigma(P_2))$.



Zero-knowledge: comparison with SQISign

Heuristic assumptions to prove the zero-knowledge property

In SQISign:

- $\sigma : E_A \rightarrow E_2$ is computationally indistinguishable from a random isogeny of degree ℓ^e .

In SQISignHD:

- E_1 is computationally close to uniform.
- We have access to a RUGDIO.

Compact signatures

Signature size comparison

	In SQISign	In SQISignHD
Asymptotic (in bits)	$\sim 23/4 \log_2(p)$	$\sim 13/4 \log_2(p)$
NIST-1 security level (in bytes)	204	116

Conclusion

Comparison of SQISignHD with SQISign

	SQISign	SQISignHD
Security	✗ <u>Ad-hoc</u> heuristic: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Distribution of σ.	✓ Simpler heuristics: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• RUGDIO;• Distribution of E_1.
Signing time	✗ 400 ms for NIST-1	✓ 10 to 100 ms for NIST-1
Signature size	✓ 204 bytes for NIST-1	✓ 116 bytes for NIST-1
Verification	✓ Fast (6 ms for NIST-1)	✗ To be implemented

Thank you for listening.

Find our pre-print here: <https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/436>